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INTRODUCTION 
 
American colleges and universities have a long history of organized 
sports that stems nearly 150 years.
1
 In 1869, Rutgers University and 
Princeton University took part in the first collegiate football game. The 
game at this time was unorganized and lack an institutional structure to 
maintain rules and safety procedures.
2
 By 1905, President Roosevelt 
addressed the concerns over injuries of these collegiate games, resulting in 
the presidents of 62 colleges and universities to create the Intercollegiate 
Athletic Association; the name was later changed to the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (“NCAA”).3  
Since that time the NCAA has grown to 1,100 member schools.
4
 
Within the NCAA rules, there are the requirement that the athletes be 
considered to be amateurs and that the athletes can receive financial 
assistance from the institutions not in excess of the cost of university 
attendance.
5
 Additionally, student-athletes, due to their amateur status, have 
been barred from profiting from their name, likeness through outside 
compensation.
6
 
This paper will provide an overview of how National Labor 
                                                 
1
 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). 
2
 Id at 1053. 
3
 Id  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id at 1054. 
6
 Id. 
  
Relations Board cases of Northwestern University and Browning Ferris 
combined with the analysis presented in the National Labor Relations Board 
General Counsel Memorandum GC 17-01: General Counsel’s Report on the 
Statutory Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor 
Practice Context could impact the laws behind unionization, the contracts 
of university athletes, and, ultimately, through contract negotiations, alter 
NCAA rules regarding student-athlete compensation. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY AND THE NLRB’S DECLINING TO EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION 
 
In Northwestern University, the Northwestern University football 
players attempted to form a labor union under the NLRA.
7
 Northwestern 
University is a university with its main campus in Evanston, Illinois.
8
 
During the time of organizing attempts, the 2013-2014 academic year, there 
were 112 students that played for the university’s Division 1 Football team.9 
Of these 112 students, 85 received a grant-in-aid scholarship.
10
 The 
scholarship is worth around $61,000 a year, in order to cover tuition, fees, 
room, board, and books.
11
 Scholarship players are required to devote 
substantial hours to football activities, but they are also full time students.
12
 
Northwestern University is a member of the NCAA and the Big Ten 
                                                 
7
 Northwestern University, 362 NLRB No. 167 (2015). 
8
 Id at 5. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
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Conference (“Big Ten”).13 Currently, only 125 school compete at the 
NCAA Division One level; only 17 of these schools are private universities 
or colleges.
14
 Northwestern University is the only private university or 
college in the Big Ten.
15
 Both the Big Ten and the NCAA set standards on 
the universities and the players, which both agree to be bound by.
16
 The 
terms that are imposed on the students include, but are not limited to: 
maintain full-time student status, maintain a certain grade point average, 
control the terms and content of the scholarship, defines amateur status that 
players must maintain, prohibiting agents, profiting from their likenesses or 
name, and regulates the number of mandatory practice hours that can be 
imposed on the players.
17
 Additionally, the NCAA controls how many 
players can travel to a football team’s away game and there are bans on the 
student making profit from their likenesses or name.
18
 
The NLRB determined that there was no dispute that Northwestern 
University is an employer under Section 2(2) of the NLRA.
19
 Additionally, 
there is no dispute that Northwestern University is engaged in commerce 
within the meaning of the NLRA.
20
 The main issue argued by the parties 
                                                 
13
 Northwestern, supra note 12 at 6. 
14
  Id at 7. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id at 6. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id at 10, note 5. 
20
 Id. 
  
and amici have focused on was the question whether the scholarship players 
in the petitioned-for unit are statutory employees.
21
 If the scholarship 
players are not employees under NLRA, then the NLRB lacks authority to 
direct an election or certify a representation.
22
 
However, the question of if a scholarship players was an employee 
was not answered in the Northwestern University case, as the NLRB 
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case.
23
 The NLRB has the ability 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction when doing so would go against the 
policies of the National Labor Relations Act.
24
 It is important to note the 
rationale behind the Board’s decision to decline jurisdiction. First, the 
NLRB had never before been asked to assert jurisdiction in a case involving 
college athletes.
25
 Second, the NLRB noted that scholarship players had 
little resemblance to the graduate student assistants or student janitors and 
cafeteria workers whose employee status the NLRB has considered in other 
cases.
26
 Finally, the NLRB also noted that since Northwestern University is 
the only private university in the Big Ten and one of the few within the 
greater NCAA Division 1 system, the decisions made with Northwestern 
University’s players would also directly involve other universities and 
                                                 
21
 Northwestern, supra note 20 at 9. 
22
 42 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
23
 Northwestern at 9. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
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colleges.
27
 
Ultimately, the NLRB decided that asserting jurisdiction in this case 
would not promote stability in labor relations.
28
 Within the NCAA Division 
One universities and colleges, the vast majority of institutions are in public 
universities; Northwestern University is currently the only private 
university.
29
 While these public institutions are, generally, subject to state 
collective bargaining laws, there are two states in which three NCAA 
Division One universities are located, have been determined by statute to 
not be considered employees under state collective bargaining laws.
30
 By 
imposing jurisdiction on one university, there would be indirect impacts on 
other teams, players within the NCAA, the Big Ten, and the member 
institutions.
31
 
It is important to note that the NLRB’s decision to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction was based on the facts in the record before them in 
Northwestern University and that changes in circumstances on how 
scholarship players are treated could later outweigh the considerations that 
motivated the decisions to decline jurisdiction.
32
  
                                                 
27
 Northwestern, supra note 26 at 9. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id at 19. 
32
 Id. at 6. 
  
GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM GC 17-01: GENERAL COUNSEL’S 
REPORT OF THE STATUTORY RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND 
STUDENTS IN THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CONTEXT 
 
While the question regarding employee-status of the Northwestern 
players was not settled by the NLRB, the discussion on the issue has hardly 
settled down. On January 31, 2017, the General Counsel to the NLRB 
issues Memorandum GC 17-01: General Counsel’s Report of the Statutory 
Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Context, 
which covered a range of legal issues regarding University faculty and 
students.
33
 Important to this conversation, the memo addressed the case of 
Northwestern University. The General Counsel reported that, while not 
concluded in Northwestern, Division One Football players in private 
colleges and universities would be consider to be employees under the 
NLRA, as the argument is supported by statutory language in the cases 
Boston Medical Center and Columbia University.
34
 
Columbia University overturned its prior divided holding to the 
contrary in Brown University, ultimately determining that graduate 
assistants enrolled in graduate degree programs met the definition of 
                                                 
33
 Memorandum GC 17-01 from Office of General Counsel, NLRB, General 
Counsel’s Report on the Statutory Rights of University Faculty and Students in the 
Unfair Labor Practice Context, https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/general-
counsel-memos (January 31, 2017) 
34
 See Boston Medical Center, 330 NLRB 152 (1999); Columbia University, 
364 NLRB No. 90 (2016). 
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“employee” in Section 2(3) of NLRA.35 Graduate students meet the 
common-law test of agency in that they “perform their duties for, and under 
the control of” their university that pays for their services.36 Additionally, 
Boston Medical Center determined that medical interns, residents, and 
hospital fellows are also considered to be employees under Section 2(3) of 
the NLRA.
37
  
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AS A JOINT EMPLOYER OF 
UNIVERSITY DIVISION ONE TEAMS 
 
The NCAA would be required to come to the bargaining table with 
organized student-athletes’ unions in a variety of sports, private colleges 
and universities. Using the Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard, the 
NCAA can be considered a joint employer of the student-athletes of NCAA 
Division One affiliated colleges and universities. A joint employer status 
exists if both entities are employers within the meaning of common law, 
and if they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms 
and conditions of employment.
38
 The NLRB case, Browning-Ferris, 
determined that when reviewing whether two employers share of 
codetermine matters governing the essential terms and conditions of 
employment it will review the control an employer has over: hiring, firing, 
discipline, supervisor, direction, determining the number of employees to be 
                                                 
35
 Statutory Rights of Students, supra note 29 at 18. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Browning Ferris Newby Island Recyclery, 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). 
  
supplied, scheduling, seniority, overtime, assignment of work and 
determining the manner and method of work performance.
39
 The standard 
has changed overtime regarding the amount of control over these factors the 
joint employer has to actually exercise to be considered a joint employer. 
In 2015, the Browning-Ferris case, relaxed the joint employer 
standard; the NLRB decided that it will “no longer require that a joint 
employer not only possess the authority to control employees' terms and 
conditions of employment, but also exercise that authority.
40
 Reserved 
authority to control terms and conditions of employment, even if not 
exercised, would be sufficient to show establish a joint employer 
relationship.”41 
APPLYING THE JOINT EMPLOYER STANDARD TO NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
 
In using this joint employer test with the facts given in, the Board 
may find that the National Collegiate Athletic Association is a joint 
employer of the Northwestern University’s Division One student-athletes. 
To reiterate the joint employer test, it states that: (1) two or more entities are 
joint employers of a single work force if they are both employers within the 
meaning of the common law, and (2) if they share or codetermine those 
matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.”42  
                                                 
39
 Browning-Ferris, supra note 38 at 70. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id at 69. 
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First, Northwestern University is both an employer under Section 
2(2), which was discussed earlier.
43
 NCAA is an employer under Section 
2(2) of the NLRA. The term “employer” includes any person acting as an 
agent, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any 
wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or 
any State or political subdivision thereof…44 As a nonprofit organization 
that is not partly or wholly owned by the United States government, the 
NCAA is an employer. Also, the student-athletes would be considered the 
“workforce” under this test, as by applying the analysis in the NLRB 
General Counsel’s Memo GC 17-01: Report on the Statutory Rights of 
University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context, 
student-athletes would be considered employees.  
Second, both Northwestern University and the NCAA both share 
and/or codetermine the matters governing the essential terms and conditions 
of employment. The NLRB uses an inclusive approach to defining 
“Essential terms and conditions of employment,” which can include, but is 
not limited to, hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, direction, determining 
wage and hours, and determining mandatory conditions of employment 
over one set of workers.
45
  
Regarding mandatory conditions of employment, according to 
                                                 
43
 Northwestern, supra note 32 at 20. 
44
 29 U.S.C. §§ 152. 
45
 Id at 70. 
  
Section 14 Academic Eligibility of the NCAA Division One 2016-17 Rules, 
the NCAA sets rules determining that student-athletes cannot compete if the 
student falls below certain academic performance.
46
 If a student falls below 
certain academic performance standards, the student would not be eligible 
to play for the upcoming or current season.
47
 These conditions are 
mandatory for all students and universities to adhere to.
48
 Additionally, in 
Section 12.7.3 Drug-Testing Consent Form, a student is not eligible for 
taking part in any sports without signing the drug-testing consent form.
49
 
Regarding firing and discipline, according to Section 19 
Enforcement of the NCAA Division One 2016-17 Rules, the NCAA sets 
standards to appeal violations of their laws, which can lead to the student no 
longer being able to compete.
50
 These rules allow for the NCAA to 
discipline and effectively fire students from their team.
51
 
For the above stated reasons, the NCAA can be considered to be a 
joint employer for Division One athletes at private university. 
 
                                                 
46
 National Collegiate Athletic Association Division One Manual 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D117.pdf (last visited May 11, 2017). 
47
 Id at 143. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id at 69. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
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CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NCAA AND DIVISION ONE 
UNIVERSITIES CAN LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STUDENT ATHLETE 
COMPENSATION RULES 
 
The NCAA has a ban in place on athletes profiting off of the names 
and likeness of collegiate student athletes.
52
 For example, NCAA prohibits 
the selling of official jerseys with players’ names on them.53 Many colleges 
and universities instead sell either blank number jerseys, or, as Ohio State 
does, either “#1” or last two digits of the year.54 However, this rule against 
profiting would be on the chopping block through contract negotiations 
between Unions, the NCAA, and the university. 
Consider the following scenario: by using the General Counsel’s 
employee analysis of collegiate athletes in combination with the joint-
employer standard qualifying the NCAA as a joint-employer of student-
athletes, many of the NCAA Division One Universities become unionized 
and are organized through either the same union or through unions with 
common long-term goals. In determining new contracts and rules for the 
student-athletes, these unions could, through strikes or public campaigning, 
challenge the rule prohibiting the students from monetizing from their name 
or likeness.  
 The question regarding profiting off of the student-athletes is one of 
                                                 
52
 Marc Tracy, Days of Selling Popular College Players‘ Jerseys Seem Numbered, 
NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/sports/ncaafootball/days-of-
selling-popular-college-players-jerseys-seem-numbered.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2017). 
53
 Id. 
54
Id. 
  
recent and constant debate. Specifically, in the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
an antitrust case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the NCAA rules barring compensation to student-athletes 
for the use of their names, images, and likenesses were subject to antitrust 
laws.
 55
 The case began when O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate 
Licensing Company, the entities which licenses the trademarks of the 
NCAA for commercial use, in federal court.
56
 In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a 
former All-American basketball player for UCLA, discovered that his 
likeness was used in a video game; the virtual player was designed to look 
like him, wear his number, and play in his position.
57
 O’Bannon never gave 
consent for his likeness to be used in this game.
58
 At the same time, Sam 
Keller, former starting quarterback for Arizona State University and 
University of Nebraska, filed suit for his likeness being used in a NCAA 
branded video game.
59
 The cases were consolidated and eventually “all 
current and former student-athletes…whose images, likenesses and/or 
names may be, or have been, included or could have been included…in 
game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by the Defendants…” were 
added as class action plaintiffs.
60
 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
55 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015). 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
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declined to consider the case, leaving the 9
th
 Circuit’s dual ruling is left 
intact.
61
 
Despite the Supreme Courts declining to consider the case, if the 
rule regarding compensation becomes a target of organized student-athlete 
unions, we could soon be seeing a significant change in the rules regarding 
student-athlete compensation without the need for judicial ruling.  
                                                 
61
 O'Bannon, 802 F.3d 1055. 
